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THE ATHENIAN DOMINATION OF BOEOTIA

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THE course of events between the battles of Tanagra and Coronea is a most unclear segment of Boeotian history. There are widely divergent interpretations of the limited and, often, doubtful evidence;¹ consequently varying conclusions have been drawn by modern scholars concerning the chronology, the role of Thebes, the formations of democracies, and the revival or survival of the Boeotian League.² It is worth trying to re-examine this material to see whether any convincing arguments can be made on these matters, and whether any conclusions may be drawn.

There seem to have been divisions amongst the Boeotians from at least the time of the Persian Wars, if not earlier. When the Persians invaded, Medizing and Hellenic partisans were observable in several cities. At Thebes the Medizing faction apparently sent out the pro-Hellenic members of the opposition to

Thermopylae.³ Thespieae and Plataea, on the other hand, were controlled by pro-Hellenes and never Medized.⁴ All other Boeotian cities joined the Persians. There is some evidence that Thebes was controlled by a very narrow oligarchy, and probably all the others were similarly governed.⁵ It is noteworthy that after the battle of Plataea the allied pressure on Thebes was dropped once the Medizing leaders were handed over.⁶ Nothing is said about a change in mode of government.

The readjustments in Boeotia after Plataea, therefore, did not necessarily mean a change in the system of government of the individual cities. It seems far more probable, in the light of Spartan leadership and interests, that Medizing oligarchs were replaced by pro-Hellenic oligarchs in all cities except Plataea and Thespieae.⁷ The Boeotian League seems to have continued in existence, but, with the eclipse of Thebes, it may be assumed that it was not

1. The main sources are Thuc. 1. 108 and 113; Diod. 11. 80–83, 12. 6–7; Arist. *Pol.* 1302b29–32; [Xen.] 3. 10–11; Plato *Menex.* 242A; Plut. *Per.* 10, 18, *Cim.* 17. See Hill, *Sources*², pp. 342, 344, for full citations.

2. Modern discussions of importance include M. Müller, *Geschichte Thebens* (Leipzig, 1879); G. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, III: 1, 1, 318–22, 419–24; J. A. O. Larsen, *CP*, LV (1960), 9–18, and *Greek Federal States* (Oxford, 1968), pp. 31–33; L. Moretti, *Ricerche sulle leghe greche* (Rome, 1962), pp. 126–34; A. W. Gomme, *Commentary on Thucydides*, I (Oxford, 1952), 314–19 and 338–40 (henceforth *Comm.*); B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, *Athenian Tribute Lists*, III (Princeton, 1950), 158–80 (henceforth *ATL*).

3. Diod. 11. 4. 7; Larsen, *Greek Federal States*, p. 31.

4. Hdt. 7. 132. 1; 7. 202; but see note below for possible Medizers at Plataea.

5. Hdt. 9. 86–88; Thuc. 3. 62. 3; cf. Larsen, *Greek Federal*

States, p. 32. Plataea may have become a democracy in the period between Marathon and Salamis; the account of an oligarchic plot in Plut. *Arist.* 13 makes more sense if this is the case. It is noteworthy that 1,000 Plataean hoplites supported the Athenians at Marathon, but only 600 fought on the Hellenic side at the battle of Plataea. No evidence is forthcoming about the government of Thespieae. One may suspect that anti-Theban or anti-League feelings, not factionalism between democrats and oligarchs, predominated at this time.

6. Hdt. 9. 88; Larsen, *Greek Federal States*, p. 32.

7. V. Ehrenberg, *From Solon to Socrates* (London, 1968), p. 212, Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, III: 1, 320 and Moretti, *Ricerche*, p. 126, argue that a democracy was established in Thebes after the Persian Wars, but on totally insufficient grounds. Certainly there were changes at Thebes, but no more than a change of oligarchical factions need be posited.

of much significance or power, except for cult and other purposes of local convenience.⁸ Certainly Orchomenus did not use the League's emblem on its coinage; Tanagra may have had some prominence at this time.⁹ For a few years Boeotia was apparently fairly quiescent, even if new ideas about democracy were gradually spreading.

By the 460's, however, the Boeotian cities must have been put into an uncomfortable position by these new ideas as well as by the erosion of the Athenian-Spartan alliance. The treaty between Athens and Megara and the invasion of the Megarid by Corinth and her allies (461-460)¹⁰ brought fighting very close indeed. There followed, *inter alia*, the dispute between Phocis and Doris in 459, which in turn led to the Spartan intervention of 459/8.¹¹ By this time, according to Thucydides (3. 62. 5 and 4. 92. 6), there was *stasis* in Boeotia.

8. Boeotian coins dated from the Persian Wars to the battle of Coronea and displaying the League shield come from Tanagra, Thebes, Acraephium, Coronea, and Haliartus. See Hill, *Sources*², pp. 328 f. There is no evidence for the dissolution of the League, *pace* Busolt and others. Larsen, *Greek Federal States*, p. 32, argues for a practical dissolution of the League. All that the sources say is that Thebes was in a lowly condition, no longer *hegemon* of the League. Moretti, *Ricerche*, p. 126, is quite right in assuming that the League continued in existence.

9. Orchomenus used sprouting grain on its coins, not the shield. See Hill, *Sources*², p. 328. For suggestions of Tanagra's pre-eminence, see Moretti, *Ricerche*, p. 126, and B. H. Fowler, *Phoenix*, XI (1957), 165 f. and 168, where the relevant material is cited.

10. Thuc. 1. 103. 4, 106; Diod. 11. 73.

11. Thuc. 1. 107. I follow the chronology given in *ATL*, III, 165-80. This is carefully based on Thucydides and on the reasonable assumption that he is following strictly a sequential recapitulation of events. This assumption requires the well-known emendation of *δεκάτω* to *τετάρτῳ* in 1. 103. 1 to make the sequence run smoothly. Attempts to preserve the MS reading by Hammond, *Historia*, IV (1955), 371-81, 396-405, by Scharf, *Historia*, III (1953-54), 153-62, and by Sealey, *Historia*, VI (1957), 368-71, are rebutted by Reece, *JHS*, LXXXIII (1962), 111-20. His own effort to retain the MS reading is based on attempts (pp. 113-15) to show that Thucydides does not really follow a strict chronological order in at least two places: (1) at 1. 103 where the end of the Messenian revolt is mentioned out of order and (2) at the end of 1. 108 and the beginning of 1. 109, where the traditional dates for the Tanagra campaign and the *periplus* of Tolmides are kept in order to put the recall of Cimon in a sensible se-

An army of 1,500 Spartans and 10,000 allies compelled the Phocians to disgorge their gains and withdraw from Doris.¹² Some question has arisen concerning the size of this force. A few scholars¹³ suppose that a small number actually came from the Peloponnese, some four or five thousand, and the tally was made up by Boeotian allies after the arrival in Phocis. No source, however, gives any support for this supposition. Thucydides clearly implies that the 11,500 were Spartans and allies from the Peloponnese,¹⁴ and Diodorus specifically says so (11. 79. 5). Diodorus does say that the Thebans became Spartan allies, but *after* the Phocian campaign.¹⁵

When the time came to go home, the Spartans faced a problem. An Athenian squadron, fifty ships according to Diodorus (11. 80. 1), had meanwhile sailed around the Peloponnese; it prevented the army from returning by sea.¹⁶ Athenian

quence; this means the *periplus* overlaps in time the embassy of Megabazus to Sparta. In order to make a case for these alleged overlaps, Reece has to maintain that there is some merit in the dates of Diodorus-Ephorus, and that *ATL* misreads the strategic picture in the Crisaean Gulf. The arguments of *ATL* (pp. 165 f.) concerning the occupation of Naupactus sound more reasonable than those of Reece; and Thucydides, and the assumption that he follows a strict sequence (even when this has to be supported by one emendation), seem preferable to Diodorus-Ephorus. Reece, in fact, gives undue weight to Diodorus.

For other possible emendations of 1. 103. 1, see Reece, *JHS*, LXXXII (1962), 111, nn. 1 and 2.

12. Thuc. 1. 107. 2; Diod. 11. 79. 4-6.

13. Reece, *JHS*, LXX (1950), 75 f.; Steup, *Comm.* on 1. 108. 1.

14. As Gomme, *Comm.*, pp. 313 f., points out.

15. Diod. 11. 81. Reece, *JHS*, LXX (1950), 76, sees this point, and has Thucydides confuse the Peloponnesian (and Boeotian) strength at Tanagra with the number of forces invading Phocis. This contradicts both Thucydides and Diodorus, and should be rejected. A possible motive for the Spartan expedition, in addition to aid the Dorians, might be to help the Locrians, who had recently been dispossessed of Naupactus, if *ATL* is right in its chronology, *pace* Accame, *RFIC*, XXX (1952), 114 f.

16. Thuc. 1. 107. 3. Naupactus, if the transports were concentrated near Cirrha, would be a better base for blockading than Pegae. Even if Peloponnesian transports had dispersed, Naupactus in conjunction with Pegae would be necessary to molest any reassembly and to prevent the Spartans from sailing home by a westerly route, as *ATL*, III, 165 points out. A crossing on a dirty night sounds a very risky

troops blocked the passes of Geranea, so that a land march was out of the question. The Spartan force then moved toward Tanagra.

Thucydides emphasizes two points: one, that the Spartans were trying to find a way to get home safely and were delaying in Boeotia; two, that the Spartans had been "secretly" approached by Athenian oligarchs "who hoped to put a stop to the people and to the building of the long walls" (1. 107. 4). The inferences are plain: the Spartans were neatly trapped by the Athenians, were going where they could get supplies, and were trying to figure out what to do next; a subsidiary motive for their presence in eastern Boeotia, one day's march from Athens, was to encourage a possible oligarchic coup there. Nothing is said or hinted by Thucydides about Spartan support for Thebes or about the re-establishment of Theban hegemony over a refurbished League.

The move to eastern Boeotia provoked a swift and strong response. The Athenians *πανδημίει* and 1,000 Argives, along with Ionians, Cleoneans, and Plataeans, as well as the treacherous Thessalians, entered Boeotia with a total force of 14,000 men.¹⁷ The Athenians had to withdraw the bulk of their troops from Megara,¹⁸ in order to come in full force; an escape route lay open for the Spartans, once this Athenian and allied army had been crushed. The armies met at Tanagra (early 458),¹⁹ and after a severe fight, in which the Thessalians changed sides, the Spartans prevailed. They were then able to withdraw to the Peloponnese, devastating the Megarid in passing.

About two months later (on the sixty-

second day) the Athenians under Myronides met "the Boeotians" at Oenophyta and defeated them. This victory made them masters of Boeotia and Phocis. They took hostages from Locris, and they destroyed the walls of Tanagra.²⁰ Thucydides says nothing about what happened between the battles of Tanagra and Oenophyta, except that the Spartans got out. Diodorus, however, says that a good deal occurred. Consequently different interpretations of the evidence have been made.

Diodorus' account (11. 79. 4–11. 83) is extremely involved and doubtful. The Lacedaemonians came to Tanagra in 458/7 after Phocis. They entered after the Athenians—with Argive and Thessalian allies, a total of 14,000 all told—had closed the passes of Geranea and had fifty ships suitably placed (80. 1). There is nothing here about oligarchic conspiracies at all. Then a battle ensued, in which the Thessalians switched sides; there was a night attack on an Athenian convoy, followed by another battle, which was alleged to have ended indecisively. A four-month truce was arranged (80. 6).

After this truce, in the next year (457/6) while the Spartan army was still about Tanagra, the Thebans, anxious to recover their former predominance, approached the Spartans for help. "They promised them for this favor that they would fight Athens by themselves, so that there would be no necessity for the Spartans to deploy an infantry force outside the Peloponnese. The Lacedaemonians thought that what they had to say was expedient, and thought that Thebes, if it became stronger, would be a sort of counterpoise to Athens" (81.

proposition for 11,500 men, in spite of Hammond, *Historia*, IV (1955), 405, note 3.

17. Thuc. 1. 107. 5. Ionians: Paus. 5. 10. 4 and Tod, *GHI*, I, 27. Cleoneans: Paus. 1. 29. 7 and Tod *GHI*, I, 28 with notes. The Plataeans were probably among the allies. They are accused by the Thebans in Thuc. 3. 63. 2 and 3. 64. 3 of

assisting the Athenians "in their attacks upon others" and of having "aided in the enslavement of the Aeginetans and other allies."

18. Gomme, *Comm.*, p. 316.

19. Thuc. 1. 107. 7; for other sources see Hill, *Sources*², p. 342; for date see *ATL*, III, 165–72.

20. Thuc. 1. 108. 1–3.

2-3). The Spartans then enlarged the circuit wall of Thebes (81. 3). Apparently, then, the Spartans evacuated Boeotia; at least we read no more about them. Diodorus goes on to tell of two battles, set in the next campaigning season (456 B.C.):²¹ one, an Athenian victory at an unnamed place under Myronides, after which the walls of Tanagra were leveled (82); the other, an even more decisive victory, with Myronides still in command, at Oenophyta (83), which led to Athenian control of all Boeotia "except Thebes," and of Locris and Phocis.

Most authorities agree that Ephorus is the source for all this, and, apart from the chronological blunders stemming from the equating of consuls and archons, the one responsible for most of the obvious mistakes, such as the doubling of the battles of Tanagra and Oenophyta.²² Besides these the discrepancies between Thucydides and Diodorus-Ephorus include: (1) the placing of the destruction of the walls of Tanagra, after the nameless battle in Diodorus, and after Oenophyta in Thucydides; (2) the four-month truce after the battle of Tanagra followed by an unknown length of time to Oenophyta in Diodorus, while Thucydides has sixty-two days and the Megarid ravaged; (3) the Theban restoration in Diodorus, not mentioned in Thucydides; (4) the reduction of all Boeotia in Thucydides, "except Thebes" in Diodorus; (5) the oligarchic plottings in Thucydides, not mentioned in Diodorus; (6) the difference observable in the motivation ascribed to the Spartans and Athenians by the two authors. Diodorus-Ephorus has the Athenians planning to ambush the Spartans at Geranea; the

Spartans evade this by going to Tanagra. Thucydides has the Spartans blocked by land and sea and staying in Boeotia while trying to figure out how to get home. Several of these discrepancies may be the result of Ephorus' inventiveness, like the doubling of battles.

The four-month truce is a case in point. In Thucydides' account the Spartans ravage the Megarid on their way home, and the Athenians return to Boeotia in sixty-odd days, both sides behaving as if there were no truce at all.²³ Of course it may be argued that the truce was abortive, and that it did not apply to Boeotians; this is possible. But the span of time of the truce does have a bearing on the opportunity for the alleged restoration of the Theban hegemony over the Boeotians. Diodorus-Ephorus sets the Theban-Spartan negotiations quite firmly after the battle of Tanagra and after the truce. If there is anything to this alleged establishment of Theban hegemony, then time was needed for negotiation and referral to Sparta, for building Theban walls, for coercing other cities into agreement, and for the Spartan retirement. Even a span of four months seems somewhat brief for all these happenings. To complete them in fewer than the sixty-two days given by Thucydides between the battles of Tanagra and Oenophyta seems highly unlikely, especially when one considers that the Spartan army had had considerable losses and was anxious to get home before the Athenians closed the passes again. It is obvious why Diodorus-Ephorus ignores the sixty-two days given by Thucydides.

If, however, Thucydides is correct, as all authorities agree he is,²⁴ then either the

21. Gomme, *Comm.*, pp. 4 f. and 316.

22. Ephorus as the source for Diodorus in this section: Jacoby, *FGrH*, IIC, 33, and comm. on 70F 231; Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, III, 319, n. 2; cf. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge, 1935), pp. 93 f. L. H. Jeffery, *BSA*, LX (1965), 57, suggests that Ephorus confused the battles of Oenoe and Oenophyta.

23. Gomme, *Comm.*, p. 316, is inclined to doubt the likelihood of this truce, though Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, III, 316, accepts it.

24. Gomme, *Comm.*, p. 317, on how the sixty-second day was remembered in tradition. Could Hellanicus have mentioned the four-month truce?

Spartan-Theban negotiations must be set back well before the battle of Tanagra and the four-month truce, or the whole story of the truce and the Theban restoration should be rejected. There is no justification for back-dating from the sources, since Thucydides does not mention the negotiations and Diodorus places them after Tanagra. One may argue for back-dating only from a priori theorizing or from a circular argument. Therefore the truce and the restoration of Theban hegemony should be rejected, along with Ephorus' doubling of battles and anecdotes about Myronides.²⁵

Ephorus often read back the present (or nearly contemporary) into past situations.²⁶ The Thebans under Epaminondas had, in Ephorus' lifetime, defeated Sparta, the dominant power, and had helped to found various leagues, including the short-lived Arcadian League. They had also helped to build the walls around Messene and perhaps Megalopolis. Sparta was, in Ephorus' mind, engaged in parallel activities in 458. After defeating the dominant power, Athens, Sparta must have founded, or supported, a short-lived federation, with motives analogous to those of the Thebans a century later; Sparta, too, must have helped in building the walls of the capital. A neat parallel and a piquant contrast, but totally without foundation.

There are slight grounds, as noted above, for believing that Tanagra may have been predominant at this time. If this

were so, then the Spartans would have had a sound additional reason for moving on Tanagra, and the emphasis that Thucydides (though not Diodorus-Ephorus) gives to the leveling of its walls would become more understandable.²⁷

With the rejection of Diodorus-Ephorus, Thucydides remains as the main source. He says²⁸ that Boeotia was in *stasis* about the time of the Tanagra campaign. This must mean quarrels, not between cities, but between factions, sometimes pro-Spartans and pro-Athenians, sometimes oligarchs and democrats, sometimes, no doubt, disputants separated on purely local issues. Therefore the Spartans marched through a disunited land and occupied one of its leading cities. They supported their partisans in various areas; this, however, does not mean a revival of the League under Theban hegemony. Most probably, in light of what was argued above, and the fact that Thucydides mentions the reduction of Phocis and Locris as well as of Boeotia, the Spartans simply gave aid to the pro-Spartans throughout Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris, and it may be safely believed that their supporters were mostly oligarchs.²⁹

Then came the battle of Tanagra, probably in June 458,³⁰ and the Athenian defeat by the Spartans, their Peloponnesian allies, and Thessalians. No strong evidence exists for the presence of Boeotians at the battle, and it is likely, therefore, that they were simply not there.³¹ All sorts of explanations are possible for their

25. Ehrenberg, *From Solon to Socrates*, p. 212; Larsen, *CP*, LV (1960), 9, and *Greek Federal States*, p. 32; Hammond, *History*², pp. 294 f.; Gomme, *Comm.*, p. 316, and many others accept the restoration of Theban hegemony. Most of them implicitly backdate it before Tanagra.

26. Noted, e.g., by Jacoby *FGH*, IIC, 23–25, 70. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus*, pp. 75–83, discusses the influence of Isocrates and its pernicious effect on E.'s historiography.

27. As pointed out by B. H. Fowler, *Phoenix*, XI (1957), 168–70.

28. Thuc. 3. 62. 5; 4. 92. 6.

29. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, III: 1, 320 f., argued that the

Spartans encouraged democracies after Tanagra; but see Gomme, *Comm.*, p. 318. It is not necessarily the case that all oligarchs were pro-Spartan.

30. *ATL*, III, 177.

31. The only mentions of Boeotians at Tanagra are in Plato *Alc. mai.* 112C and Paus. 1. 29. 9. Both are highly compressed narratives and may well mean the whole season's campaigning in reality. Plato talks about Athenians, Lacedaemonians, and Boeotians dying at Tanagra and Coronea. Pausanias sounds rather like a confused rehash of Ephorus, but this may be the result of compression.

absence: the Spartans did not, in their opinion, need them; by some hitch in planning the Boeotian forces did not arrive in time; or, perhaps, there was a provision in the Spartan arrangement with the Thessalians that excluded the Boeotians from the fight. On the other hand it would seem reasonable to expect some sort of support for the Spartans from their partisans. At any rate the Spartans moved out shortly after their victory, leaving pro-Spartan oligarchs in control throughout Phocis, Locris, and Boeotia, but not, as far as can be observed from the evidence, a Theban dominion.

The victory of Oenophyta made the Athenians masters of Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris. The Diodoran story of the conquest of all Boeotia "except Thebes" (II, 83. 1) seems likely to be another example of Ephorus' reading back parallels to contemporary situations. Just as Sparta or Megalopolis remained unconquered when its League collapsed, Thebes would also have had to remain unconquered, when Myronides defeated "the Boeotians." It seems, therefore, reasonable to reject the exception of Thebes from Athenian domination, especially as Aristotle clearly implies the establishment of a democracy in Thebes after Oenophyta.³² It is worth noting that the Thessalians seem to have supported the Athenians at Oenophyta, to judge from a dedication at Delphi.³³

32. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1302b29–32) refers to democracy in Thebes after Oenophyta that was subverted by bad government. The exception of Thebes from Athenian domination is supported by Larsen, *CP*, LX (1960), 9 f., with the hypothesis that the Athenians first controlled, then very shortly after Oenophyta lost their control of Thebes. This seems far too deferential to Diodorus. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, III, 319 f. and n. 3, also supports Diodorus, because it fits his theory that a pro-Spartan Theban democracy was overthrown by oligarchs, and Athens could safely ignore them. Walker, *CAH*, V, 469; Hammond, *History*², p. 295; and Ehrenberg, *From Solon to Socrates*, p. 213, support the idea of Theban independence; but most others, from Müller, *Geschichte Thebens*, p. 64, to Gomme, *Comm.*, p. 317, reject it on grounds of general probability.

That the defeated Boeotians were pro-Spartan oligarchs, and not confederate forces under Thebes, is borne out by the sequel in Thucydides. The walls of Tanagra, not Thebes, were destroyed; Phocis as well as Boeotia was gained; hostages were taken from Locris; and Boeotians, not simply Thebans, were exiled.

The Athenians naturally supported pro-Athenian factions in the several Boeotian towns. No doubt in some of them, such as Thebes, these groups established democracies. In others, however, pro-Athenian oligarchies replaced pro-Spartan; this seems a reasonable inference from a remark by the Old Oligarch about what little profit the Athenians obtained from supporting oligarchs, in Boeotia, for example.³⁴ So long as a town supported them, the Athenians apparently did not concern themselves overmuch with how it was governed.³⁵ Thebes, Thespieae, and Plataea were almost certainly all democracies. We may suspect strongly that the unwall'd city of Tanagra was democratic. The rest were probably pro-Athenian oligarchies. To judge by the coin types and the fact that "the Boeotians" operated as Athenian allies, we may conclude that the League still existed.³⁶

The alliance of Athenians, Boeotians, and Phocians seems to have been fairly active. A treaty with the Amphictyonic

33. *SEG*, XVII, 243; see Larsen, *Greek Federal States*, p. 125 and n. 3.

34. [Xen.] 3. 10–11. Larsen, *CP*, LV (1960), 17, n. 2, would place Athenian support for Boeotian oligarchs during some unknown situation in the period between 479 and 462; I think wrongly.

35. It is clear from the presence of oligarchies in the Delian League (in Lesbos until well after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, for example) that there is nothing unlikely in the idea that the Athenians were more concerned with local support than with establishing democracies. They had no objection to the latter, but they were more interested in the former. But cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1302b22.

36. Coins with the League shield and dated between the battles of Tanagra and Coronea come from Thebes, Haliartus, Tanagra, and Acraepheum. Hill, *Sources*², pp. 328 f.

League³⁷ set the seal on Athenian predominance in the area. The allies marched into Thessaly to support Orestes, son of Echecratides the former *Tagos*, in a bid for power, but without much success.³⁸ Possibly, too, the expedition was intended to chase out various Boeotian and Euboean exiles who were dangerously close to their homelands.³⁹ The expedition is probably to be dated to 454.⁴⁰

The internal history of the Boeotian states during the 450's remains obscure. The democracies were probably of the type known from Athens itself and from the Delian League, with a sovereign popular assembly, a council chosen by lot, and most magistracies also allotted.⁴¹ The assembly would be composed of all (loyal) adult males. Most of these citizens would have had little or no political or administrative experience. Those that did would be mostly oligarchs in exile; the lot would effectively prevent any few administrators available from being properly utilized. A pro-Athenian oligarchy would have similar problems in obtaining sufficient experienced men loyal to Athens. Certainly cities in such a condition could well have "anarchy" and "disorder" as Aristotle indicates (*Pol.* 1302b29), or at least be unreliable from an Athenian point of view. Gomme's supposition, that the Boeotian democracies were mostly incompetent, would seem reasonable.⁴² A Boeotian League at this time would be at best weak, presumably with a synod of the

traditional Delian or Amphictyonic pattern.

At any rate by 449 Sparta was ready to intervene again in central Greece and, no doubt, to encourage whatever discontent there might be in Boeotia. This readiness culminated in a Sacred War, dated to 449/8.⁴³ The Spartans prevailed over the Phocians, apparently delayed for a time (at least, so we must assume to harmonize Theopompus and Thucydides), and then withdrew. The Athenians forthwith marched to Delphi under Pericles (447/6) and restored the situation, but not as successfully as they had hoped; for by the winter of 447/6⁴⁴ Boeotian exiles, with the aid of Locrians, Euboean exiles, and "like-minded adherents," seized Orchomenus and Chaeronea.⁴⁵ This group, which was led by one Sparton, was known as the "Orchomenizers."⁴⁶ The word implies that they were an identifiable body, with some sort of recognizable common goal; the phrasing of Thucydides indicates that a number of Boeotians not in exile joined the group, probably those displeased with Athens, or with democracy, or both. We may therefore believe that the Orchomenizers were primarily Orchomenians, with others who were also pro-oligarchical, eager for a strong federation and for an independent Boeotia.

The Athenians decided to send out an expedition of 1,000 hoplites plus allied contingents under Tolmides against the Orchomenizers, probably in the spring of 446.⁴⁷ This seems a very small force for a

37. *IG*, I², 26; Larsen, *Greek Federal States* pp. 125 f., and 126 n. 1 for references.

38. Thuc. 1. 111; Diod. 11. 83-84, dated to 457/6. See Larsen, *Greek Federal States*, p. 125, for discussion of the politics of Thessaly at the time.

39. Larsen, *CP*, LV (1960), 10, points out that the exiles later entered Boeotia from the northwest. A hostile Thessaly would provide a suitable base.

40. *ATL*, III, 178.

41. For Athens, Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22. 5 *et passim*. See also J. W. Headlam, *Election by Lot at Athens*² (Cambridge, 1933). For the Delian League see the nearly contemporary Erythrae Decree (*IG*, I², 10, *ATL*, II, D 10) dated 453/2. One wonders

whether the loyalty oaths in the Decree were perhaps first devised a few years earlier for Boeotia.

42. Gomme, *Comm.*, p. 318.

43. Thuc. 1. 112. 5; Plut. *Per.* 21; Philochorus, *FGrH*, 328 F 34. For date see *ATL*, III, 178, and Gomme, *Comm.* D 409.

44. *ATL*, III, 173 f.

45. Thuc. 1. 113. 1. Cf. Hellanicus, *FGrH*, 4 F 81; Theopompus, 115 F 407; and Aristophanes the Boeotian, 379 F 3—all from Steph. Byz., s.v. *Χαιρόνεα*.

46. See above citations from *FGrH* for Orchomenizers. For Sparton, see Plut. *Ages.* 19.

47. *ATL*, III, 179, and cf. Gomme, *Comm.*, p. 409.

venture into western Boeotia,⁴⁸ and several explanations are possible for its size. Perhaps the Athenians were rashly overconfident, as Plutarch⁴⁹ implies in his anecdote about Pericles asking for a delay in sending out the force. But the behavior of this force renders it unlikely. After taking Chaeronea it withdrew without making any attempt on Orchomenus. An unusual action for a rash and overconfident army.

Faulty intelligence might seem a more probable explanation. A small punitive expedition was sent, it could be argued, to deal with a minor irruption into Orchomenian territory. On arrival it was realized that the situation was far more serious than had been thought. There was a precipitate withdrawal in order to regroup and reinforce. But why, then, would Pericles be opposed to the sending out of the force and ask for a delay? To hold to the view set out above, one must reject the anecdote in Plutarch. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the Athenians had an elaborate plan of operations. It has been argued that Tolmides' planting of cleruchies in Euboea in 447/6 was part of the strategy of his campaign, "partly to prevent communication through Chalkis between disaffected elements on the island and exiles in Boeotia" and partly to keep this area quiet.⁵⁰ The implication, if this argument has merit, is that the Athenians regarded the trouble at Orchomenus as very serious indeed.

Far more likely is a third possibility, that the Athenians were well informed, but that their forces were temporarily fully extended; that some Orchomenian initiative required an Athenian response; and that 1,000 hoplites plus allies were all that were immediately available. At this time, spring

446, there was a garrison in Megara and Nisaea; there was fighting in the Chersonese and Thrace;⁵¹ there was some reluctance in paying tribute in the Delian League, and no doubt substantial Athenian forces were required to aid the collection;⁵² garrisons and cleruchies had to be provided for Imbros, Chalcis, Eretria, Pegae, and some ports in Achaea. Prima facie the Athenians could not have had too many forces available for operations in Boeotia without regrouping. It seems likely that the Orchomenizers struck first, before the Athenians' dispositions were completed for a Boeotian campaign.

If this is so, then Pericles' desire for delay becomes as understandable as Tolmides' anxiety to march at once. On the one hand, a wise policy might be not to alter plans, but to hold off until strong forces were available, so that the rebellion could be firmly crushed. On the other hand, in view of changed circumstances, delay might be very dangerous and lead to a temporary loss of all Boeotia. Recovery could be difficult and expensive. Thus the problem was which would be the better course: to delay until troops could be gathered, and risk having to fight a costly campaign; or to move immediately, take a chance, and hope that the trouble could be stopped before it got too far. This dilemma provides an economical explanation for the Athenian action. The opinion of Tolmides, that something had to be done, and fast, prevailed. The presence of allies doubtless indicates that the Athenians hoped to provide a nucleus around which pro-Athenian Boeotians would rally.

The expedition, bolstered by some allies, probably Plataeans and Thespians,⁵³ pro-

48. Larsen, *CP*, LV (1960), 10, makes this point.

49. Plut. *Per.* 18.

50. *ATL*, III, 294.

51. Megara: Thuc. I. 114. 1. Chersonese and Thrace: Plut. *Per.* 19. 1 and *ATL*, III, 299.

52. *ATL*, III, 299 f.

53. The Plataeans stayed loyal to Athens; the Thespians, even in the Peloponnesian War, could be suspected of Atticism: Thuc. 4. 93, 96.

ceeded to capture Chaeronea. Orchomenus was obviously too much for this small force, and the hope was that the garrison in Chaeronea would seal it off temporarily.⁵⁴ The strategy seems to be Tolmides', very similar to that employed in Euboea.

The main force, less the garrison of Chaeronea, fell back toward Haliartus, perhaps to sit down and await reinforcements of loyal Boeotians and of Athenians, and to insure the safety of central Boeotia. To judge by the speed with which Pericles was later able to send troops into Euboea, a substantial Athenian force was in the process of being concentrated in Athens at the time that Tolmides was marching toward Haliartus. Since the Euboeans then seemed to be well in hand,⁵⁵ and the Megarian revolt came as a complete surprise,⁵⁶ the conclusion is that this force was being assembled for operations with Tolmides in Boeotia. But the Orchomenizers again moved too fast. Somewhere in the neighborhood of Coronea Tolmides' small force was ambushed and defeated, Tolmides himself being killed.⁵⁷

This defeat changed the whole strategic picture. The strike force and rallying point was gone; the nearest Athenian army was still forming up in Athens; Chaeronea and the Euboean cleruchies were now isolated, and themselves in need of rescue; the architect of the Athenian strategy was dead; a substantial body of Athenian prisoners was in Boeotian hands.

The Athenians had gambled and lost.⁵⁸ The credit for the victory accrued to Orchomenus and the Orchomenizers,⁵⁹ and they were now in a position to exploit their initiative. The remarks in the Old Oligarch about Athenian support for oligarchs proving disastrous, and in Aristotle about Thebes abandoning democracy, would be apropos to the time immediately after Coronea.

The Athenians, however, were still dangerous. Their army could march into Boeotia; the prospect of facing the victors of Oenophyta must have been daunting. They could rally their friends, especially the Plataeans and Thespians. On the other hand it might be a bloody and expensive business; there were the isolated garrisons and the prisoners to consider, too. The Euboeans were very restless and with Boeotian help might very well succeed in breaking loose. The Spartans were threatening. Obviously there was ample reason on both sides to negotiate, and the ensuing negotiations led to what I think was a mutually beneficial and satisfactory set of arrangements. It is tempting to believe that the Thespians honored in a contemporary Athenian decree may have been instrumental in bringing about the agreement.⁶⁰

We learn from Thucydides (1. 113. 3) that the Athenians agreed to evacuate "all Boeotia" and obtained the prisoners in exchange. But other points not mentioned by Thucydides may be inferred from later

54. As Larsen, *CP*, LV (1960), 10, notes.

55. The Euboean towns had apparently paid their tribute in the spring of 446. Gomme, *Comm.*, p. 340, and *ATL*, III, 294.

56. Thuc. 1. 114. 1.

57. Thuc. 1. 113. 3-4. Death of Tolmides: Plut. *Per.* 18. 2 and *Ages.* 19. 2; Diod. 12. 6. 2; Paus. 1. 29. 14. Cleinias, father of Alcibiades, also among the slain: Plato *Alc. mai.* 1. 112C. The location of the battle is uncertain. Plut. *Ages.* 19. 2 says it was near the temple of Itonian Athena; Paus. 1. 27. 5 says the Athenians were on their way to Haliartus. These would indicate a location north and a little east of Coronea. But Xen. *Mem.* 3. 5. 4. says it was near Lebadea. Probably,

then, it was close to the temple, not far from the borders of Coronea and Lebadea.

58. The Athenians honored Tolmides and his seer with a memorial, Paus. 1. 27. 5. An inscription from the grave of the Athenian dead blames some demigod (Hill, *Sources*², pp. 301 f.). Evidently it was felt the defeat was not Tolmides' fault, but rather a "bad break."

59. So Larsen, *CP*, LV (1960), 11, and *Greek Federal States*, p. 33. This is supported by the dedication at Olympia of a bronze helmet to Zeus by the Orchomenians from Coronea, *SEG*, XI, 1207.

60. *IG*, 12, 36.

actions. First, the Boeotians agreed not to help Euboea. At least no Boeotians aided the Euboeans when they revolted, in spite of their previous services. Second, the Athenians were granted right of passage through Boeotia for military purposes. Athenian forces proceeded to Pegae and to Chalcis by way of Boeotian territory.⁶¹ Third, all Boeotian states were to be autonomous; that is, some states, like Plataea and perhaps Thespieae might be democracies, while other states might employ other forms of government. This is implicit in Thucydides and others. Fourth, Oropus and other march areas were to remain Athenian. Fifth, the Athenians acquiesced in or gave approval to a reorganization of the Boeotian League that gave ample protection to its friends, Thespieae and Plataea.

It is generally agreed that the reorganization of 446 B.C. is the basis of the constitution described in *Hell. Ox.* 11 (*FGrH* 66. 11) without the later changes that followed upon the eventual domination by Thebes.⁶² In the earlier version Plataea, Thespieae, Thebes, and Orchomenus each had two Boeotarchs and two of eleven shares in various federal organs of state (though Orchomenus may have had originally three Boeotarchs and shares).⁶³ Plataea and Thespieae did not compare in weight to either Orchomenus or Thebes, but were granted parity.

Clearly the reason for such treatment must lie in the internal politics of the League and its relations with Athens, particularly with Orchomenian desire for predominance and, no doubt, Athenian desire to keep an interest in Boeotian affairs (or at least the opportunity to do so), as well as to make a gesture of support

for her Theban and Plataean allies. These desires would be complementary.

Orchomenus was the leader, not Thebes, in 446.⁶⁴ But Thebes was powerful, and an Athenian satellite like Plataea could provide a useful counterpoise. From the Athenian point of view a friendly Plataea would be a convenient buffer against Thebes, and, if necessary, provide an entry into Boeotian affairs. Thus Orchomenus, Plataea, and Thespieae together could check Thebes, by controlling the federal machinery and, if all were friendly to Athens, act in the Athenian interest. At the best, then, Athens could see a friendly Boeotia, and at the worst it had a foothold in Boeotia in case of trouble. At the best Orchomenus had a friendly system of relations with Athens, and at the worst a series of balances to Thebes in an independent League.

All in all, Athens seems to have made the best of a rather difficult situation and to have saved face, while Orchomenus liberated Boeotia, established her hegemony over a vigorous League, and balanced off Thebes. The Athenians went on to cope with Euboea, Megara, and Sparta, while Boeotia watched.

The conclusions one may draw are fairly clear. First, the Boeotian League existed in some form from the Persian Wars down to 446 when it was extensively reorganized. During much of this period Tanagra may have had a major role in League affairs. Second, Thebes remained in eclipse from 479 to well after 446. It played little or no role in Boeotian politics until several years after the reorganization of 446. There was no attempted revival of Theban hegemony after Tanagra. Arguments to the contrary are based on

61. These two points are made by Gomme, *Comm.*, p. 342.

62. Larsen, *Greek Federal States*, pp. 33 f.; Ehrenberg, *Staat der Griechen*², pp. 150 f.; Moretti, *Ricerche*, p. 132.

63. Larsen, *CP*, LV (1960), 10–18, has argued for three

Boeotarchs and three shares for the Orchomenians. He is probably correct.

64. See n. 59. This view seems now to be gaining wider acceptance, in my opinion correctly.

the use of Diodorus-Ephorus, and grave doubts can be raised about his truthfulness. Third, democracies were established in only some of the Boeotian cities after Oenophyta. In others, pro-Athenian oligarchies maintained power. The accepted association between democracy and Athenian sympathies seems somewhat exaggerated for Boeotia at this time. Fourth, Orchomenus was the center of oligarchic resistance and was the power behind the reorganization of the Boeotian League. Sparta played little or no part in this series of events. Fifth, the agreement after

Coronea worked out remarkably well from the Orchomenian point of view, and gave the Athenians the opportunity to save face. It also gave the pro-Athenian towns like Plataea enough weight in League counsels to protect themselves and to voice, if need be, Athenian interests. Sixth, the arrangements of the reorganized League did not envisage the revival of Thebes as a power in the League and consequently left a pro-Athenian town like Plataea in a position to be a *casus belli* in the future.

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